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1. Why Levels?
In The Sciences of the Artificial, Herbert Simon (1969) offers the parable of the watchmakers, 
Tempus and Hora. Tempus builds watches holistically, holding each part in place until it forms a stable 
whole. Hora builds watches modularly, first assembling stable components and then organizing them 
into watches. Each is interrupted now and then. When Tempus is interrupted, she loses all her work on 
the watch and has to start again from scratch. When Hora is interrupted, she loses only her work on a 
single component. Hora thrives; Tempus struggles. The Moral: Evolved systems are likely to have 
(nearly) decomposable architectures. Their working parts are likely to be organizations of working 
parts, which are themselves organizations of parts, and so on. In other words, evolved systems likely 
exhibit regular mechanistic organization at multiple levels.
One might object to this argument on the ground that watches do not reproduce or that 
biological evolution does not assemble components sequentially (Bechtel and Stufflebeam 2001). As 
Simon points out, this would miss his point, which has now been repeated across many domains of 
science and philosophy: viz., that nearly decomposable (or modular) systems are more stable than 
holistic systems; they are to be expected when we find improbable stability in the face of random 
challenges. Contemporary work in network analysis, for example, shows that modular networks (those 
with high intra-modular connectivity and sparse inter-modular connectivity) are more “robust” than 
networks that are less modular; e.g., their mean minimum path length remains low in the face of 
random attacks. This is important, for example, in telecommunication, air traffic control, and neural 
networks (Albert et al. 2000). Such “modularity” is a widely accepted principle of both development 
and evolution (see Schlosser and Wagner 2004). Systems with causally independent parts are expected, 
in part, because nearly decomposable components can be independently assembled, regulated, 
damaged, and repaired without disturbing the other components. In short, everywhere we look from 
abstract theoretical considerations to concrete details of biology, we find reasons to expect dynamic but
stable systems to be arranged in nearly decomposable hierarchies. Where we find embedded 
decompositions of working parts within working parts, we find nested mechanistic explanations.
Indeed, the assumption of near decomposability underlies the strategy of reverse engineering, 
of discovering how something works by learning how its parts interact. Kauffman (1970) calls this 
practice “articulation of parts explanation;” Haugeland (1998) calls it “explanation by system 
decomposition;” Cummins (1975) calls it “functional analysis;” Fodor (1966), Craver (2007), and 
others (Machamer 2004; Glennan 2002; Menzies 2011) call it “mechanistic explanation.” Mechanistic 
explanations explain a phenomenon by situating it in the causal structure of the world. In constitutive 
mechanistic explanations (as opposed to etiological and contextual mechanistic explanations; see 
Craver 2001), one looks to a lower level, within the phenomenon, to reveal its internal causal structure. 
In many such systems, one can explain the behavior of the whole in terms of the organized behaviors of
its parts, and one can explain the behaviors of the parts in terms of the organized behaviors of their 
parts. Levels, on this view, are simply embedded mechanistic explanations. 
In this essay, we explicate this mechanistic view of levels (Section 2), contrast it with other 
senses of “level” (Section 3), and sketch its implications for emergence (Section 4) and reduction 
(Section 5), for the ontological status of higher-level phenomena (Section 6), and for thinking about the
lowest level(s) in such hierarchies (Section 7).
2. Mechanistic Levels
We use the term “mechanism” permissively to describe causal systems in which parts are 
organized such that they collectively give rise to the behavior or property of the whole in context (cf. 
the notion of minimal mechanism in Chapter 1). As mentioned above, not all mechanisms are modular 
at intermediate levels. In regular networks of simple nodes, for example, there is no nearly 
decomposable structure between the behavior of the mechanism as a whole and the activities of the 
parts.  All mechanisms involve the organization of interacting parts, but not all mechanisms have 
intermediate levels of organization.
Mechanisms so construed contrast with aggregates (see Section 3 below) in that mechanisms 
are organized. The parts of mechanisms have spatial (e.g., location, size, shape, and motion), temporal 
(e.g., order, rate, and duration), and active or otherwise causal (e.g., feedback or other motifs of 
organization; see Levy and Bechtel 2013) relations to one another such that they work together. This is 
why mechanistic hierarchies are often called “levels of organization.” Aggregates, in contrast, are the 
lower limit of mechanistic organization: No between-component interactions are relevant to the true 
aggregate.
Figure 14.1 depicts three mechanistic levels. At the top is the activity of some mechanism as a 
whole (S's ψ-ing). S's ψ-ing includes the mechanism as a whole (e.g., the protein synthesis mechanism) 
doing what it does (e.g., synthesizing proteins). In this diagram, ψ is the topping-off activity of the 
mechanism; it is the activity to which all of the lower-level components are relevant. Beneath S's ψ-ing 
are the activities (ϕi) and components (Xj) organized such that together they ψ. Beneath that is an 
iteration of the levels relation, in which one of the X's ϕ-ings is decomposed into the organized ρ-ings 
(rho-ings) of Ps. As Simon suggested, this process of decomposition might continue until we run out of 
either relevant or practically salient decompositions. Individually, the Xj and ϕi are organized to 
compose S's ψ-ing. Collectively, the Xj and ϕi exhaustively constitute (or, as is often said, “realize”) S's 
ψ-ing in context. 
X's ϕ-ing is at a lower mechanistic level than S's ψ-ing if and only if X and its ϕ-ing are 
component parts and activities in S's ψ-ing. A component is a part whose activities contribute to the 
behavior of the mechanism as a whole. The components (Xj) are spatially contained within S (because 
components are necessarily parts of the things they compose). Furthermore, each component is relevant
to S's ψ-ing: X's ϕ-ing should contribute to (or be operative in) S's ψ-ing (see Martin and Deutscher 
1966).
There is some debate about how this interlevel relevance relationship should be understood. 
Craver (2007) defines it in terms of the mutual manipulability of the whole and the part: X and its ϕ-ing
are component parts and activities of S's ψ-ing if one can manipulate S's ψ-ing by intervening on X's ϕ-
ing, and one can manipulate X's ϕ-ing by manipulating S's ψ-ing. This is a sufficient, but not necessary,
condition for componency, as there might be parts of a mechanism that do not change during its 
operation (consider the walls surrounding pistons in a car engine) or redundant parts that can be 
independently manipulated with no effect on the behavior of the mechanism as a whole. Couch (2011) 
argues that componency should be understood in terms of Mackie's notion of an INUS condition. 
Components are Insufficient and Non-redundant parts of an Unnecessary but Sufficient set of 
contributors to S's ψ-ing. Still others (such as Harinen 2014 and Romero 2015; see also Craver 2007) 
understand constitutive relevance as causal betweenness: a component of a mechanism is causally 
intermediate between the mechanism's start conditions and its termination conditions (see Chapter 9 on 
parts and boundaries of mechanisms). 
Furthermore, Figure 14.1 is ambiguous: Two distinct relations are represented in both the top 
and bottom (corresponding roughly to what Gillett (2002) calls dimensioned and flat realization). The 
first is a part-whole relation between S's ψ-ing and each of the X's individual ϕ-ings. We use the term 
“mechanistic level” exclusively for this relation. The second is a whole-whole relation between two 
ways of describing the same thing. We can talk about S's ψ-ing or we can talk about the organized 
collection of ϕ-ing Xs. These are two ways of describing one and the same object. Likewise, at the 
bottom of the figure, we can talk about a given X's ϕ-ing or we can talk about the organized collection 
of ρ-ing Ps in virtue of which X ϕs. Again, these are two levels of description that apply to one and the 
same object. Marr's levels of realization are like this: the computational level, the algorithmic level, and
the implementation level are three ways of describing one and the same whole (Marr 1982; see also 
Chapter 30). We return to this issue in Section 6.
The above explication of mechanistic levels has several conceptual benefits. First, it accurately 
describes the multilevel explanatory structures one finds in biology and other special sciences, and 
makes explicit the kinds of evidence required to evaluate such explanations. Second, it satisfies many 
of our pre-analytic intuitions about the levels of explanation. Things at higher mechanistic levels are 
typically larger (and necessarily no smaller) than things at lower levels because the latter are parts of 
the former. Things at lower levels often take less time than things at higher levels because activities at 
lower-levels compose activities at higher levels. And the idea of mechanistic levels captures the 
common idea of “levels of organization” because higher-level mechanisms are made up of organized 
parts and activities. Third, this understanding of levels clarifies why interlevel causation is at least 
prima facie mysterious: causation between mechanistic levels must involve parts interacting with their 
wholes (see Section 4).
Finally, this understanding of levels helps to undermine the thought that nature can be usefully 
divided into monolithic levels of, e.g., atoms, molecules, cells, organs, organisms, and societies 
(Oppenheim and Putnam 1958). For mechanistic levels, there is no unique answer to the question of 
when two items are at the same mechanistic level. There is only a necessary condition: X's ϕ-ing and 
S's ψ-ing are at the same level of mechanisms only if (i) X's ϕ-ing and S's ψ-ing are components in the 
same mechanism, (ii) X's ϕ-ing is not a component in S's ψ-ing, and (iii) S's ψ-ing is not a component 
in X's ϕ-ing. Unlike size levels or levels defined in terms of the types of objects found at a given level, 
mechanistic levels are defined by the componency relationship between things at higher and lower 
levels. If two things are not related as part to whole, they are not at different levels; if they are in the 
same mechanism, then they are in this limited sense “at the same level”. But one might just as easily 
say on this basis that sameness of level has no deep conceptual significance for mechanistic levels. 
Note, for example, that the levels of nearly decomposable structure in stars do not correspond to
the levels in starfish. Each has parts and wholes, but the parts and wholes are of different kinds. It is an 
empirical question, answered case by case, how many levels there are in a system. It makes no sense to 
ask whether hippocampi are at a higher or lower mechanistic level than horses. They are not 
components in the same mechanism; they are not related as parts to wholes. For some, this is 
tantamount to abandoning the idea of levels (e.g., Eronen 2015). We see our account rather as a 
distillate of the ordinary scientific concept, an extraction of an explanatorily and metaphysically central
idea, leaving behind as residue the problematic commitments inherent in our inchoate, folk talk of 
“levels.” 
3. Comparisons and Contrasts
The ordinary concept of “level” is inchoate, in part, because the term is used promiscuously to 
describe many distinct kinds of relata and relations. Here we distinguish mechanistic levels from 
aggregates, size levels, causal levels, and Oppenheim and Putnam's levels. 
As noted above, mechanisms contrast with aggregates. In aggregates, the property of the whole 
is literally a sum of the properties of its parts. The concentration of a fluid is an aggregation of 
particles; allelic frequency is a sum of individual alleles. Aggregate properties change linearly with the 
addition and removal of parts, they don't change when their parts are rearranged, and they can be taken 
apart and reassembled without any special difficulty. This is because in true aggregates, spatial, 
temporal, and causal organization are irrelevant (Wimsatt 1997). Mechanisms, in contrast, are literally 
more than the sums of their parts: they change non-linearly with the addition and removal of parts, their
behavior is disrupted if parts are switched out, and this is because their spatial, temporal, and causal 
organization make a difference to how the whole behaves.
Though distinct, mechanisms and aggregates are nonetheless species of a genus: each involves a
relationship between the properties or activities of wholes and the relevant properties or activities of 
their parts. Many mechanisms (from steam engines to action potentials) rely on both mechanistic and 
aggregative relations. As noted above, aggregation is the limit as mechanistic organization goes to zero.
Mechanistic levels also contrast with size levels. The relata in size levels are space-involving 
entities (like cells), and they are higher- or lower-level than one another because they are bigger or 
smaller, respectively. They are “at” a level when they have the same (or similar) sizes. Mechanistic 
levels are also orderable by size, but the size relationship between mechanistic levels follows from the 
more fundamental, compositional relationship. Like Wimsatt's (1976) classic image of levels as peaks 
of regularity and predictability, nearly decomposable mechanisms will tend to carve most naturally at 
interfaces between components, thereby identifying isolable pockets of regularity and predictability. 
Wimsatt describes but does not explain why these levels of regularity and predictability cluster at 
different size scales. In mechanistic levels, the clustering is explained by patterns of near 
decomposability in the mechanism's causal organization.
Sometimes the term “level” is used to describe relations among the stages in a causal pathway, 
as when one distinguishes “higher-level” and “lower-level” visual areas (e.g., area MT and V1, 
respectively) or, arguably, when one speaks of “higher level executive functions.” These causal 
relations are clearly distinct from the compositional relation involved in mechanistic levels. MT is not 
part of V1, but downstream in a causal process from V1; lower-level cognitive functions are not parts 
of higher-level cognitive functions, but asymmetrically controlled or dominated by higher-level 
cognitive functions (see Churchland and Sejnowski 1992). 
The term “levels” is also associated with Oppenheim and Putnam (1958), who structure their 
view of the unity of science around a monolithic conception of levels. They carve the world into 
roughly six ontological strata (societies, organisms, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles). 
Each stratum corresponds to a distinct field of science, from economics at the top to particle physics at 
the bottom. Each level has its distinctive theory. The unity of science consists in the explanation of 
higher-level theories in terms of lower-level theories. 
Oppenheim and Putnam could easily have embraced mechanistic levels as the ontic component 
of their picture; things at higher levels are wholes made up of things at lower levels. As Wimsatt (1986)
notes, however, this minor amendment does violence to the simplicity of Oppenheim and Putnam's 
vision of scientific unity. If levels are compositional, and different mechanisms decompose into 
different kinds of parts, then we should not expect a uniform decomposition of all things into the same 
kinds of parts (compare stars to starfish and hippocampi to horses).
Oppenheim and Putnam's vision of scientific unity is descriptively inadequate, as they would 
likely acknowledge. Both sciences and theories run rough-shod over levels. Models and theories often 
span levels of organization, linking phenomena studied by different fields of science (Darden and 
Maull 1977; Craver 2005; 2007). Scientific fields are also increasingly transdisciplinary (e.g. 
neuroscience, ecology). Things that are the same size can usefully be investigated by altogether distinct
fields of science: Cytologists, anatomists, and electrophysiologists all study cells with different tools. 
The relation between fields of science, levels of theory, and ontological levels is thus many to many to 
many.
The notion of mechanistic levels provides a compelling alternative to the Oppenheim and 
Putnam model. Mechanisms span multiple levels of organization. Scientists approach these structures 
and processes with diverse tools and from diverse theoretical vantage points. The unity that results 
from this collaboration is more like a mosaic than a layer cake: it is achieved when different scientists 
with different instruments and modeling tools, use their diverse expertise to understand the same 
mechanism (Craver 2003; 2007).
4. Levels, Emergence, and Interlevel Causation 
Do things at higher levels “emerge” from things at lower levels? And can things at different 
levels causally interact? If we think of levels as mechanistic levels, these questions have clear content, 
and it is clear what is at stake in answering them. 
Mechanisms are not aggregates. A property or activity at a higher level of mechanistic 
organization (e.g., S's ψ-ing) is literally more than the sum of the properties of its parts. So, if 
emergence is defined as the failure of aggregativity (call this organizational emergence; Wimsatt 
(1997)), then things at higher mechanistic levels emerge organizationally from things at lower levels. 
No ontological extravagance is required: two stacked toothpicks have the organizationally emergent 
capacity to catapult raisins. Neither toothpick can catapult raisins alone: so the whole has capacities the
parts alone do not possess. 
Often the term “emergence” is used in an epistemic sense to refer to the inability to predict the 
properties or behaviors of wholes from properties and behaviors of the parts. Epistemic emergence can 
result from our ignorance, such as failing to recognize a relevant variable, or from failing to know how 
different variables interact in complex systems. It might also result from limitations in human cognitive
abilities or current-generation representational tools (Boogerd et al. 2005; Richardson and Stephan 
2007). The practical necessity of studying mechanisms by decomposing them into component parts 
raises the epistemic challenge of conceptually putting the parts back together so they work (Bechtel 
2013). Epistemic emergence results from the limits of our knowledge or of our representational 
capacities, not from discontinuity in the world's causal structure (see Chapter 28).
Ontic emergence is suspect or promising (depending on one's perspective) precisely because it 
involves such discontinuity: there are higher-level properties and capacities that have no sufficient 
(ontic) explanation in terms of the parts, activities, and organizational features of the system in the 
relevant conditions. Some say life, consciousness, or intentionality are emergent in this sense. 
Mechanistic levels, in contrast, are levels of mechanistic dependence: they are defined in terms of 
componency (Craver 2014). If that ontic relationship is severed, then the sense in which emergent 
properties are at a “higher level” must be different than the sense in mechanistic levels. Indeed, it is 
unclear why properties that ontically emerge should be thought of as higher-level at all (rather than, 
e.g., effects of a cause). Ontic emergence, whatever its virtues, is mysterious precisely because it is 
distinct from, and so gains no plausibility from verbal association with, organizational or epistemic 
emergence. Organizational and epistemic emergence are unmysterious both in scientific common sense
and common sense proper (Van Gulick 1993; Kim 1998). Appeal to ontic emergence, on the other 
hand, arouses suspicion because it is committed to the existence of phenomena that have no sufficient 
(ontic) mechanistic explanation. 
Can things at different mechanistic levels properly be said to causally interact with one another?
Many common assumptions about causation appear to block this thought. For Hume and Lewis, the 
relata in a causal relationship must be distinct, “and distinct not only in the sense of nonidentity but 
also in the sense of nonoverlap and nonimplication. It won't do to say that my speaking this sentence 
causes my speaking this sentence; or that my speaking the whole of it causes my speaking the first half 
of it; or that my speaking causes my speaking it loudly, or vice versa.” (Lewis 2000, p. 78). Wholes and
parts overlap; a token S's ψ-ing as a whole includes every part of S's ψ-ing, and that includes all the Xj, 
ϕi, and organizing relations. On Salmon's process view of causation, the relata in causal relations must 
intersect in space-time, exchange conserved quantities, and maintain those changes after the 
intersection ends. But parts and wholes are always everywhere together; the whole has no additional 
conserved quantity to pass to its parts. The relationship between LTP and the opening of NMDA 
receptors during LTP induction is directly analogous to the relationship between speaking the whole of 
a sentence and speaking its first half. The induction of LTP is partly constituted by the opening of the 
NMDA receptor. The would-be cause in this top-down causal claim already contains the would-be 
effect; talk of causation across levels of mechanism thus appears inappropriate (Craver and Bechtel 
2007).
What about the bottom-up case? Here we must guard against an ambiguity. Sometimes 
mechanists describe the “phenomenon” as an activity or process that starts with the mechanism's setup 
conditions and ends with its termination conditions (Machamer et al. 2000). For example, Long-Term 
Potentiation (LTP) is described as a process beginning with rapid and repeated stimulation of the 
presynaptic neuron and ending with enhanced synaptic transmission. Other times, mechanists describe 
the phenomenon as the product of that process (as one of its termination conditions). For example, the 
mechanism of LTP produces a potentiated synapse. This second phrasing leads us to seek the 
antecedent causes: the tetanus and the subsequent changes in the NMDA receptor. But if we think about
the phenomenon as a process, an input-output relation starting with the tetanus and ending with a 
potentiated synapse, then we should not say the NMDA receptor is a cause of that, if we wish to speak 
accurately about the ontic structure of the situation at hand. The NMDA receptor is a part of that causal 
process; it causes neither itself nor its antecedents in the mechanism.
5. Reduction 
Like “level,” “reduction” is used many ways. Sometimes, it expresses a thesis about 
explanation, about how one theory or law is explained by other theories or laws. Other times, it is a 
thesis about scientific integration and unity, about the relationships among the diverse branches of 
science. And still other times, it is a metaphysical thesis about the structure of the world (Section 6). 
The idea of mechanism offers considerable insight into explanation and scientific integration. Although
the mechanistic view of levels alone does not resolve the deepest ontological puzzles, it nonetheless 
offers a descriptively adequate image of the kind of ontological structure by which the manifest 
phenomena of our world might be (and arguably are) related to its most fundamental parts and 
activities. 
According to the covering law (CL) model, reductive explanations involve deriving higher-level
theories from lower-level theories with the aid of bridge laws connecting their distinct theoretical 
vocabularies (Nagel 1961; Schaffner 1993). This model of explanatory reduction serves as a valuable 
ideal in the search of mechanisms. A description of the behavior of the mechanism should be shown to 
follow from a description of the parts and their interaction, as one understands them. For example, 
Hodgkin and Huxley showed that one could recover the shape of the action potential from measured 
values of ionic concentrations and experimentally determined ion-gating functions coupled with laws 
governing electrical circuitry. Yet this epistemic test of the sufficiency of an explanation should not be 
confused with the explanation itself. 
Not all predictively adequate models are explanatory. We can, as Hempel (1965) argued, derive 
Boyle's law from the conjunction of Boyle's law and Kepler's laws, but not in a way that explains it. We
can predict the behavior of a part from the description of the behavior of the whole and the behaviors of
a few other parts, despite the fact that many expect such micro-reductive explanations to work only 
from the bottom up. We can predict the behavior of a system by tracking the right correlations in the 
system irrespective of their causal relations to one another (as in diagnosis and prognosis) and would 
not thereby explain the system's behavior. Finally, the classical model of reduction is not equipped with
an account of explanatory relevance, a way to determine which predictively relevant features are 
explanatorily relevant and which are not. If one thinks of reduction not as primarily an epistemic, 
deductive relationship between descriptions of the behavior of a mechanism and of the organized 
activities of its component parts but as a matter of learning and revealing the causal structure of a 
mechanism, these problems for the classic theory of micro-reductive explanation are directly addressed 
(Craver 2007).
Given the multilevel structures found in mechanistic explanations, it's clear that scientific 
integration will not conform to the layer cake pattern Oppenheim and Putnam describe across science 
as a whole. Interlevel linkages will be of more local significance, relativized to particular explanandum 
phenomena. Different fields of science collaborate with one another both to bridge across mechanistic 
levels and to bring their unique perspectives to bear on one and the same thing. A kind of mosaic unity 
results from having the same mechanism as the target of one's scientific investigation; integration 
occurs when the findings from different fields and perspectives mutually constrain our understanding 
of how the mechanism works. 
This mechanistic perspective provides an attractive successor to empiricist views of explanation
as a model of interfield integration. First, it is based on a more accurate and informative view of levels. 
Second, it provides significantly more insight into the diverse evidential constraints by which interlevel
bridges are evaluated and into the forces driving co-evolution across different levels (Craver and 
Darden 2013). Constraints on the parts, their causal interactions, and their spatial, temporal, and 
hierarchical organization all help to flesh out an interfield theory. Finally, many mechanists argue that 
classical reduction models are myopically focused on downward-looking explanations at the expense of
a fuller account of the details by which interlevel and interfield theories more generally are constructed 
and evaluated. This is especially true when one must look up to higher levels to see how a part 
contributes to a mechanism of which it is a component and in which two fields combine findings “at” 
rather than across mechanistic levels.
6. The Ontological Status of Higher-Level Phenomena
We turn now to the metaphysical questions central to many philosophical discussions of 
reduction: what is the relationship between higher-level phenomena and things at lower levels?
We disambiguated two questions implicit in Figure 14.1. The first is: Is the behavior of the mechanism 
as a whole greater than the sum of the behaviors of its parts? We defend an affirmative answer above. 
The second question is: Is the behavior of the mechanism as a whole greater than the organized 
interaction of its parts in context (commonly called the realizer of the mechanism's behavior)?
Simple examples suggest that the relationship between the phenomenon and its realizer is more 
intimate than correlational, causal, and nomologial relationships are. In a standard mousetrap, if the 
trigger is depressed, the catch slides, and the impact bar completes its arc (collectively, M), then the 
trap necessarily fires (F). We are precluded from imagining that all the stages of M have occurred but 
that the trap has not fired precisely because there is nothing more to be done, no activity or property to 
add, to transform M in context, into an instance of F. We are similarly precluded from imagining in a 
population of mousetraps composed of identical parts organized and interacting identically with one 
another in the same conditions, that only 30% of these mechanisms should fire and 70% should not. 
Correlational, causal, and nomological relationships are not necessarily like this. The intimacy between
a phenomenon and its realizing mechanism thus appears to be stronger, more metaphysically necessary,
than a simple matter of regularity, causation, or law. The behavior of the whole contains the behaviors 
of the parts, and the behaviors of the parts collectively and exhaustively constitute the behavior of the 
whole. Dualism, parallelism, and emergentism do not share this commitment and allow that there are 
properties and activities of wholes that are not exhaustively constituted by lower-level mechanisms. 
This metaphysical commitment functions as a constitutive ideal in the search for mechanistic 
explanations (Haugeland 1998). If one knows all of the relevant entities, activities, and organizational 
features, and knows all the relevant features of the mechanism's context of operation, and can in 
principle put it all together, then one must know how the mechanism will behave. This was Hempel’s 
important insight about the epistemology of explanation. It is an epistemic warning sign if features of 
the mechanism's behavior cannot be accounted for in terms of our understanding of its parts, activities, 
organization and context. Mechanists thus operate with a background assumption that the phenomenon 
is exhaustively explained (in an ontic sense) by the organized activities of parts in context.
One is tempted to say that higher-level phenomena (in a given context) are identical to the 
organized activities of the mechanism's parts (in that context). By this one might assert a type identity, 
according to which ψ-ing in general is identical to the organized ϕ-ing of X's, or a token identity, 
according to which each instance of ψ-ing is identical to some organized ϕ-ing of X's. Classical 
reductionists favor type identity, though this thesis is largely out of fashion (though see Polger 2004). 
As Putnam (1967) and Fodor (1974) argued, such type-identity statements are false when the 
phenomenon is or can be multiply realized in distinct mechanisms. There are many ways to trap a 
mouse and many ways to produce an action potential. If so, the same type of phenomenon might be 
instantiated on different occasions in different mechanisms; the realized type is not the same as the 
realizer type. 
Bechtel and Mundale (1999) counter that this argument rests on an illusory matching of grains 
between the characterization of the phenomenon and the characterization of the mechanism. If one 
characterizes the phenomenon abstractly, then many mechanisms can or could give rise to it. If one 
characterizes the phenomenon in fine detail (including for example, all its excitatory, inhibitory and 
modulatory conditions), then the class of actual and potential realizers might shrink to one. If the 
phenomenon and the mechanism are characterized at comparable degrees of abstraction, then the thesis
of type-identity begins to look more promising. 
But perhaps a deeper problem for type-identity is lurking in the background and not so easily 
addressed: the question of whether there is, in general, an “appropriate” grain of analysis that 
adequately captures the phenomenon and the mechanism at once. Even some token things are multiply 
realizable: One and the same rook in a chess game might be instantiated at different times by different 
figurines (imagine replacing a lost plastic castle midgame with a Fig Newton; Haugeland 1998). One 
and the same kidney is made up of different parts over a person's lifetime. To answer whether ψ and the
organized collection of ϕ-ers are the same thing, we need to be able to answer the question “The same 
what?” with a non-dummy sortal (Marcus 2006). The conditions under which something is the same ψ-
er might be different from the conditions under which it is the same organized collection of ϕ-ers, in 
which case there are no individuation conditions that cover the thing both as a ψ-er and as an organized
collection of ϕ-ers, and there is no sense to the question of whether they are identical. Items at different 
mechanistic levels are no-doubt intimately related, but our ordinary notions of token and type identity 
appear poorly equipped to describe that relation. For these reasons, we prefer to speak of a particular 
organized ϕ-ing of X's as exhaustively constituting a particular ψ-ing at or over a time.
Instead of asking about identity, one might ask rather about whether phenomena have causal 
powers in a given context that the organized collection of interacting parts do not have. As noted above,
it is relatively uncontroversial that wholes can do things their parts cannot do (see Kim 1998, 85). Do 
realized phenomena have causal powers their realizing mechanisms do not have in the same contexts? 
If one thinks of the phenomenon as identical to the behaving mechanism, then the answer is no: the two
have all and only the same powers. Non-reductive physicalists have traditionally attempted to argue 
that, though higher-level phenomena are all ontically explainable in terms of more fundamental 
mechanisms, there remains a sense in which the higher-level phenomena have causal powers of their 
own. 
Again, issues of multiple realization arise. Suppose a neuron generates an action potential, 
causing neurotransmitters to be released from the cell. Whenever it does, we suppose there is a 
determinate set of entities (ions, channels, etc.) organized and interacting in determinate ways that fully
constitutes it at that time. Now suppose we ask: which feature of the world is relevant to the release of 
neurotransmitters: the action potential or the determinate organization and interaction of ions and 
channels? One standard test of causal relevance is to ask what would happen if the cause had been 
different. Experimental investigation will reveal that the action potential makes a substantial difference 
to the probability of neurotransmitter release by raising membrane voltage. The precise arrangement of 
ions and ion channels makes no difference except insofar as it affects membrane voltage. Many 
differences among the realizers make no difference to the effect in question. If causal relevance is a 
matter of making a difference (Woodward 2003), the fine details about the realizing mechanism are not 
causally relevant. Each action potential is exhaustively constituted by a mechanism, but the causally 
relevant difference is the occurrence of the action potential, not the precise mechanism that produced it 
(see Craver 2007, Chapter 6).  
Just how this mechanistic perspective best fits with metaphysical views about, e.g., identity and 
causal powers, remains to be decided. A determinate view about multiple realization and its 
implications requires metaphysical commitments that go beyond the skeletal framework of levels 
presented here. Views on multiple realization differ depending, inter alia, on how one thinks about 
properties (Heil 1999), the realization relation (Shapiro 2004), and theories (Klein 2013). Similarly, the 
prospects for token physicalism depend, inter alia, on one's account of events (Kim 2012) and identity 
(Marcus 2006). One goal of future work is to integrate the mechanistic perspective with a metaphysics 
that produces a coherent and plausible view of the structure of the mechanistic world. 
7. The Lowest Level 
Questions also arise concerning the bottom of a hierarchy of mechanisms. Two options seem to 
be available: either 1) the hierarchy has a bottom or 2) it does not, i.e., it continues ad infinitum. 
Though both options are metaphysically live, some facts about quantum mechanics seem to favor the 
first.
It has been argued, for example, that the non-separability of ontological units in the theories of 
quantum mechanics entails that there are no distinct objects to be identified as components beneath a 
certain level of organization. Kuhlmann and Glennan (2014) argue that for any local, classical 
phenomenon, there is a lowest classical level at which mechanistic explanation bottoms out. Precisely 
where it bottoms out varies across phenomena because decoherence – the physical process by which 
the quantum realm becomes classical – is itself local. Below this level, where properties like spatial 
location are indeterminate, prospects for mechanistic explanation are murky. Mechanistic explanation 
may still be possible if quantum phenomena can be explained by causal organization among non-local 
“objects” (for example, see the discussion of laser light [Kuhlmann and Glennan 354]), but in quantum 
holistic cases where the properties of subsystems don't appear to determine the properties of the whole 
system (for example, EPR experiments), the constitutive ideal may be unreachable. 
8. Conclusion
Our goal has been to sketch the mechanistic approach to levels, to contrast it with near 
neighbors, and to explore some of its metaphysical implications. This perspective provides some 
important content missing from standard metaphysical discussions of levels. Most notably, it offers a 
clear sense of what it means for things to be at different levels. It also allows us to distinguish 
mechanistic levels from realization relations. And finally, it provides a clearer vision of the structure of 
multilevel explanations, the evidence by which such explanations are evaluated, and the form of 
scientific unity that results from building them. The mechanistic approach does not, by itself, solve all 
the metaphysical questions one might have about physicalism. Yet it does provide a skeletal framework
for thinking about how the macroscopic phenomena of our world are or might be related to its most 
fundamental parts and activities. Simon's parable and its many contemporary analogues give us reason 
to think that this skeletal picture captures a central and important pattern in the causal structure of our 
world.
1. Thanks to Mike Dacey, James Gulledge, Ben Henke, Eric Hochstein, Emily Prychitko, and Felipe 
Romero for invaluable comments and to Pamela Speh for design of Figure 14.1.
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